On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections

42 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2011 Last revised: 23 Mar 2015

Jon X. Eguia

Michigan State University - Department of Economics; University of Bristol - Department of Economics

Antonio Nicolo

University of Padua - Department of Economics; University of Manchester

Date Written: June 2013

Abstract

We study the relation between the electorate's information about candidates' policy platforms during an election, and the subsequent provision of inefficient local public goods by the elected government. More information does not always lead to better outcomes. We show that the equilibrium outcome is efficient if voters are partially uninformed; whereas, if the electorate is very well informed, electoral competition leads candidates to provide inefficient local public goods in all equilibria.

Keywords: Elections, information, inefficiency, pork, local public goods, campaigns.

JEL Classification: D72, D61, D82, H41

Suggested Citation

Eguia, Jon X. and Nicolo, Antonio, On the Efficiency of Partial Information in Elections (June 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1931040

Jon X. Eguia (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824
United States

University of Bristol - Department of Economics ( email )

8 Woodland Road
School of Economics, Finance and Management.
Bristol, BS8 1TN
United Kingdom
+44 (0) 117 928 8419 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/economics/people/jon-x-eguia

Antonio Nicolo

University of Padua - Department of Economics ( email )

via Del Santo 33
Padova, 35123
Italy

University of Manchester ( email )

Arthur Lewis Building
Oxford Road
Manchester, M13 9PL
United Kingdom

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