Vote-Buying and Reciprocity

22 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2011

See all articles by Frederico Finan

Frederico Finan

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Laura Schechter

University of Wisconsin at Madison - Agricultural and Applied Economics; University of Wisconsin at Madison - Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2011

Abstract

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

Suggested Citation

Finan, Frederico and Schechter, Laura, Vote-Buying and Reciprocity (September 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17411, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931183

Frederico Finan (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Laura Schechter

University of Wisconsin at Madison - Agricultural and Applied Economics ( email )

427 Lorch St.
Madison, WI 53706-1503
United States

HOME PAGE: http://aae.wisc.edu/lschechter

University of Wisconsin at Madison - Economics ( email )

William H. Sewell Social Science Building
1180 Observatory Drive
Madison, WI 53706-1393
United States

HOME PAGE: http://aae.wisc.edu/lschechter

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