Competition in Persuasion

37 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2011

See all articles by Matthew Gentzkow

Matthew Gentzkow

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Emir Kamenica

University of Chicago

Date Written: September 2011

Abstract

We study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.

Suggested Citation

Gentzkow, Matthew Aaron and Kamenica, Emir, Competition in Persuasion (September 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17436. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931208

Matthew Aaron Gentzkow (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Emir Kamenica

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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