Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights

Sandholtz, Wayne (2012). "Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights." Journal of Human Rights 11(1): 17-32.

30 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2011 Last revised: 15 May 2018

See all articles by Wayne Sandholtz

Wayne Sandholtz

University of Southern California - School of International Relations; University of Southern California Gould School of Law

Date Written: September 21, 2011

Abstract

The effects of treaties on human rights performance may depend in part on how domestic legal systems articulate with international law. The idea motivating this study is that constitutional law can make a difference not necessarily by including rights but by acknowledging and connecting to treaty law. This study is a first attempt to explore the interrelated effects of treaties, constitutions, and courts on human rights performance. The key proposition is that human rights treaties may have a greater influence on rights in countries whose constitutions incorporate treaty law and whose courts are independent of the political branches of government. The analysis tests that proposition using data from about 150 countries across 20 or more years. The results offer evidence that treaties, constitutions, and courts do combine, at times, to improve human rights performance, with judicial independence playing the key role.

Keywords: human rights, treaties, constitutions, judicial independence

Suggested Citation

Sandholtz, Wayne, Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights (September 21, 2011). Sandholtz, Wayne (2012). "Treaties, Constitutions, Courts, and Human Rights." Journal of Human Rights 11(1): 17-32.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1931779

Wayne Sandholtz (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - School of International Relations ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

University of Southern California Gould School of Law ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
124
Abstract Views
679
rank
224,604
PlumX Metrics