Enforcement and Disclosure under Regulation FD: An Empirical Analysis

Accounting & Finance, Forthcoming

Posted: 23 Sep 2011  

Paul A. Griffin

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management; University of California, Davis

David H. Lont

University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance

Benjamin Segal

Fordham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 21, 2011

Abstract

While Regulation FD was designed to benefit investors by curbing the selective disclosure of material non-public information to “covered” investors, such as analysts and institutional investors, it can also impose costs. This paper finds that FD levies three kinds of enforcement and disclosure costs. First, investors cannot recover as part of an SEC enforcement action the gains to covered investors from their alleged use of the non-public information. Second, investors lose because the market responds negatively to an SEC enforcement announcement. Third, investors suffer because some companies post their FD filings well after the due date, without earlier public disclosure.

Keywords: Regulation FD, Enforcement Action, Untimely FD Disclosure, Late SEC Filing, Event Study

JEL Classification: G14, K22, M41

Suggested Citation

Griffin, Paul A. and Lont, David H. and Segal, Benjamin, Enforcement and Disclosure under Regulation FD: An Empirical Analysis (September 21, 2011). Accounting & Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1931884

Paul A. Griffin

University of California, Davis - Graduate School of Management ( email )

3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

University of California, Davis ( email )

3102 Gallahger Hall
Davis, CA 95616
United States
(530) 752-7372 (Phone)
(425) 799-4143 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.gsm.ucdavis.edu/griffin/

David H. Lont (Contact Author)

University of Otago - Department of Accountancy and Finance ( email )

Box 56
Dunedin, Otago 9054
New Zealand
+64 3 479 8119 (Phone)
+64 3 479 8171 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.business.otago.ac.nz/acty/

Benjamin Segal

Fordham University ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

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