Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Non-Profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulation

Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 948-991, 2011

UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2011

46 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2011  

Oonagh B. Breen

Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin

Date Written: September 12, 2011

Abstract

"To what extent is it acceptable in the interests of the greater public good for national or international regulatory regimes to affect the manner in which international charities achieve their missions?" Policymakers may argue that competing public interests demand regulatory oversight of charities. Nonprofits may concede the argument in favour of regulation if two conditions are met – first, that the reality of the supposed threat is supported by empirical evidence; second, that the measures are proportional to the likelihood of the alleged threat occurring.

This paper explores these issues in the context of EU regulation of nonprofits, outlining the still-evolving European policy on non-profit regulation and tracing the emergence of the European response in the aftermath of 9/11 and the issuance of FATF Special Recommendation VIII. The paper reviews recent moves by the European Commission away from initiatives linked to the war on terror towards a policy grounded in broader accountability and transparency goals inspired by financial propriety, and considers the impact of these developments from the perspective of affected NGOs and national regulatory authorities.

Suggested Citation

Breen, Oonagh B., Through the Looking Glass: European Perspectives on Non-Profit Vulnerability, Legitimacy and Regulation (September 12, 2011). Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 948-991, 2011; UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1932653

Oonagh B. Breen (Contact Author)

Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin ( email )

Sutherland School of Law
Belfield
Dublin 4
Ireland

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