The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation: Change and Persistence in the German Model

38 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2011

See all articles by John T. Addison

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia; Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Alex Bryson

UCL; National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR)

Andre Pahnke

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB)

Abstract

This paper depicts and examines the decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany. Using repeat cross-section and longitudinal data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we show the overwhelming importance of behavioral as opposed to compositional change and, for the first time, document workplace transitions into and out of collective agreements via survival analysis. We provide estimates of the median duration of coverage, and report that the factors generating entry and exit are distinct and symmetric.

Keywords: sectoral and firm agreements, changes in collective bargaining/works council coverage, shift-share analysis, bargaining transitions, survivability

JEL Classification: J50, J53

Suggested Citation

Addison, John T. and Teixeira, Paulino and Bryson, Alex and Pahnke, Andre, The Structure of Collective Bargaining and Worker Representation: Change and Persistence in the German Model. IZA Discussion Paper No. 5987. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1933344

John T. Addison (Contact Author)

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paulino Teixeira

Universidade de Coimbra - Faculdade de Economia ( email )

Av. Dias da Silva, 165
Coimbra, 3004-512
Portugal

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1 D-68161 Mannheim
Germany

Alex Bryson

UCL ( email )

20 Bedford Way
London, WC1H 0AL
United Kingdom

National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) ( email )

2 Dean Trench Street
Smith Square
London, SW1P 3HE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.niesr.ac.uk/staff/staffdetail.php?StaffID=307

Andre Pahnke

Government of the Federal Republic of Germany - Institute for Employment Research (IAB) ( email )

Regensburger Str. 104
Nuremberg, 90478
Germany

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
38
Abstract Views
571
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations will be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information