The Impact of State Taxes on Self-Insurance

38 Pages Posted: 7 Jan 2000

See all articles by Douglas A. Shackelford

Douglas A. Shackelford

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Bin Ke

National University of Singapore; Independent

Kathy R. Petroni

Michigan State University - Eli Broad College of Business and Eli Broad Graduate School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1999

Abstract

This paper assesses whether insurers' state taxes reduce purchases of property-casualty coverage. Tests are conducted using state aggregates of insurer-level data from publicly-available, annual accounting reports for 1993, 1994, and 1995. A positive relation between self-insurance and state taxes is detected, consistent with consumers opting to self-insure rather than bear the incidence of higher insurer taxes. As expected, tax effects vary with the elasticity of demand. When demand is largely inelastic, e.g., automobile liability coverage, taxes do not affet self-insurance.

JEL Classification: H25

Suggested Citation

Shackelford, Douglas A. and Ke, Bin and Petroni, Kathy Ruby, The Impact of State Taxes on Self-Insurance (November 1999). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=193391 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.193391

Douglas A. Shackelford (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina Kenan-Flagler Business School ( email )

Kenan-Flagler Business School
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States
919-962-3197 (Phone)
919-962-4727 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Bin Ke

National University of Singapore ( email )

Mochtar Riady Building, BIZ 1, #07-30
15 Kent Ridge Drive
Singapore, 119245
Singapore
+6566013133 (Phone)

Independent

Kathy Ruby Petroni

Michigan State University - Eli Broad College of Business and Eli Broad Graduate School of Management ( email )

East Lansing, MI 48824-1121
United States
517-432-2924 (Phone)
517-432-1101 (Fax)

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