Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks: The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-107

23 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2011 Last revised: 3 Oct 2011

See all articles by Roy H. A. Lindelauf

Roy H. A. Lindelauf

Military Operational Science

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Bart Husslage

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: September 28, 2011

Abstract

The identification of key players in a terrorist network can lead to prevention of attacks, due to efficient allocation of surveillance means or isolation of key players in order to destabilize the network. In this paper we introduce a game theoretic approach to identify key players in terrorist networks. The advantage of this approach is that both the structure of the terrorist network, which usually reflects a communication structure, as well non-network features, which represent individual parameters like financial means or bomb building skills, can be taken into account. The application of our methodology results in rankings of the terrorists in the network. We illustrate our methodology by two case studies: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Bali bombing and Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attack, which has led to new insights in the operational networks responsible for these attacks.

Keywords: terrorism, network analysis, centrality, game theory

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Lindelauf, Roy H. A. and Hamers, Herbert and Husslage, Bart, Game Theoretic Centrality Analysis of Terrorist Networks: The Cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda (September 28, 2011). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-107. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1934726 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1934726

Roy H. A. Lindelauf (Contact Author)

Military Operational Science ( email )

Kasteelplein 10
Breda, 4811 XC
Netherlands

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Bart Husslage

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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