Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

Beath, Andrew; Christia, Fotini; Enikolopov, Ruben

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1935055

Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-6

38 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2011 Last revised: 1 Oct 2016

See all articles by Andrew Beath

Fotini Christia

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Political Science

Ruben Enikolopov

Institute of Political Economy and Governance; New Economic School; ICREA; Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Barcelona GSE

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 30, 2016

Abstract

Direct democracy is designed to better align policy outcomes with citizen preferences. To test this proposition, we randomized whether 250 villages across Afghanistan selected projects by secret-ballot referenda or by consultation meetings. We find that referenda reduce the influence of local elites over both project type and location. Consistent with previous experimental results, we also find that referenda improve villagers’ perceptions of the local economy and of the quality of local governance. However, we find no systematic evidence that selecting projects via referenda increases the average impact of such projects.

Keywords: political institutions, field experiment, electoral system, direct democracy

JEL Classification: D7, O1

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Beath, Andrew and Christia, Fotini and Enikolopov, Ruben, Direct Democracy and Resource Allocation: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan (September 30, 2016). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2011-6. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1935055 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1935055