A Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Adjudication - The Austrian Constitutional Court

Austrian Journal of Public Law

14 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2011 Last revised: 31 Dec 2020

See all articles by Christoph Bezemek

Christoph Bezemek

University of Graz, Faculty of Law, Institute of Public Law and Political Science

Date Written: October 3, 2011

Abstract

For more than 100 years the “American system” of adjudication mastered by one Supreme Court vested also and in particular with the power to review administrative as well as legislative acts enjoyed the virtual monopoly to serve as the role-model of Constitutional review. When the Austrian Constitution was enacted in 1920, however, it should be supplemented by an “Austrian system” designed by Hans Kelsen; creating a specialized body to review the constitutionality of legislative acts – the first Constitutional Court. This article provides an introduction to the Court’s organization and proceedings.

Keywords: Judicial Review, Constitutional Adjudication

Suggested Citation

Bezemek, Christoph, A Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Adjudication - The Austrian Constitutional Court (October 3, 2011). Austrian Journal of Public Law, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1937575 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1937575

Christoph Bezemek (Contact Author)

University of Graz, Faculty of Law, Institute of Public Law and Political Science ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15 / FE
A-8010 Graz, 8010
Austria

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