Disciplinary Deficit: Crisis, Collaborative Regulation and Political Economies

23 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2011  

Mark Findlay

Singapore Management University - School of Law

Date Written: October 3, 2011

Abstract

The paper explores the features and charts the principle theorizing of regulatory sociability from collaboration rather than intervention, whatever the interest-based motivation within crisis, towards orderliness. It concludes with a discussion of disciplinary deficit, in terms of the way that compulsory regulatory preference remains low on the orderliness continuum. We argue that as compulsory discipline increases, it may produce compliance but at costs for regulatory sociability. The alternative regulatory paradigm is one which moves to resolve the antimony between desire and reason in a manner which relies on and endorses the constituents of collaboration.

Collaborative regulation, the paper suggests, can arise out of crisis and be justified through desires for orderliness without compulsion. But for collaborative regulation to be sustainable it must complement certain positive ‘orderly’ aspects within political economy. The analysis determines some observations concerning the shape and shaping of collaborative regulation in an atmosphere of more pluralist knowledge based (disciplinary) engagement.

Keywords: collaborative regulation, risk to ordering, sociability, global crisis, international regulatory networks

JEL Classification: K10, K30

Suggested Citation

Findlay, Mark, Disciplinary Deficit: Crisis, Collaborative Regulation and Political Economies (October 3, 2011). Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 11/64. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1938045

Mark James Findlay (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - School of Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore, 179943
Singapore

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