Economic Growth and Corporate Governance Imperfections
21 Pages Posted: 4 Oct 2011
Date Written: January 1, 2000
Abstract
This paper formally proves that economic outcomes are not independent from the corporate governance system and its ability to protect shareholders’ rights. This is achieved by extending a neoclassical growth model to incorporate an imperfectly functioning market for managerial labour enabling management to maximise own private benefit alongside profit.
Keywords: Economic growth, shareholders rights, corporate governance, speed of convergence
JEL Classification: E2, G3, L16, O11, O43, P12, P27
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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