A Generalized Jury Theorem

23 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2011 Last revised: 10 Oct 2011

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Columbia University - Law School

Eva-Susanne Hendriks

Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics

Maarten Havinga

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: October 5, 2011

Abstract

The literature on information-aggregation based on the Condorcet Jury Theorem focuses on binary choices. By applying well-known statistical methods to this issue, we develop a framework of analysis capable of dealing with a broader set of choices, including choices over a continuum. We obtain two main results. First, we prove a Generalized Jury Theorem, including the Condorcet Jury Theorem as a special case. Second, we show that the Generalized Jury Theorem (rather than the Condorcet Jury Theorem) should be used to model the behavior of jurors, when jurors have a common goal and communicate before voting; the reason is that our framework allows for more efficient aggregation of information than the traditional framework. Our findings are illustrated by means of concrete applications.

Keywords: Condorcet, Jury Theorem, information-aggregation, committee, collegial courts, representative democracy

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D83, K49

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Hendriks, Eva-Susanne and Havinga, Maarten, A Generalized Jury Theorem (October 5, 2011). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2011-39; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2011-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939823 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1939823

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/giuseppe-dari-mattiacci

Eva-Susanne Hendriks

Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, 1018 WB
Netherlands

Maarten Havinga

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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