Landownership Concentration and the Expansion of Education

52 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2011

See all articles by Francesco Cinnirella

Francesco Cinnirella

University of Bergamo; University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CAGE

Erik Hornung

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: September 30, 2011

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of landownership concentration on school enrollment for nineteenth-century Prussia. Prussia is an interesting laboratory given its decentralized educational system and the presence of heterogeneous agricultural institutions. We find that landownership concentration, a proxy for the institution of serf labor, has a negative effect on schooling. This effect diminishes substantially in the second half of the century. Causality of this relationship is confirmed by introducing soil-texture to identify exogenous farm size variation. Panel estimates further rule out unobserved heterogeneity. We argue that serfdom hampered peasants’ demand for education whereas the successive emancipation triggered a demand thereof.

Keywords: land concentration, institutions, serfdom, education, Prussian economic history

JEL Classification: O430, Q150, I250, N330

Suggested Citation

Cinnirella, Francesco and Hornung, Erik, Landownership Concentration and the Expansion of Education (September 30, 2011). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3603, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939848

Francesco Cinnirella (Contact Author)

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana 2
Bergamo, 24129
Italy

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

DK-5230 Odense
Denmark

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschingerstrasse 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CAGE ( email )

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London, NW10 7LQ
United Kingdom

Erik Hornung

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) ( email )

Cologne
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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