To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending Approaches to the Union’s Diplomatic Objectives and Representation

The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 11, January 2012

20 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2011 Last revised: 12 Jan 2012

See all articles by Daniel C. Thomas

Daniel C. Thomas

Leiden University, Institute of Political Science

Ben Tonra

University College Dublin (UCD)

Date Written: July 15, 2011

Abstract

The strengthened Office of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the new External Action Service (EAS) presuppose a set of interests and/or values that the EU wishes to pursue on the world stage. But what are those interests and/or values and how does the EU reach agreement on them? Rather than simply ‘cutting and pasting’ from EU treaties and strategy papers, this paper identifies seven distinct theoretical models of how the EU and its member states arrive collectively at a definition of their diplomatic objectives. The seven models include intergovernmentalist models of veto threats and log-rolling, normative institutionalist models of cooperative bargaining and entrapment, and constructivist and sociological institutionalist models of elite socialisation, Europeanisation and collective identity formation. The paper identifies the logics of each model and notes their implications for the role of the EU’s new foreign policy institutions.

Keywords: European Union, foreign policy, CFSP, interests, preferences

Suggested Citation

Thomas, Daniel C. and Tonra, Ben, To What Ends EU Foreign Policy? Contending Approaches to the Union’s Diplomatic Objectives and Representation (July 15, 2011). The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 11, January 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939938

Daniel C. Thomas (Contact Author)

Leiden University, Institute of Political Science ( email )

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences
PO Box 9555
Leiden, 2300 RB
Netherlands

Ben Tonra

University College Dublin (UCD) ( email )

Belfield, Dublin 4 4
Ireland

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