62 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Date Written: October 10, 2011
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure
JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (October 10, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822; Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1941708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941708