Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1941708
 
 

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Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information


Dirk Bergemann


Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris


Princeton University - Department of Economics

October 10, 2011

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822
Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011

Abstract:     
We define a notion of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information in a general setting with finite players, finite actions, and finite states, which we call Bayes correlated equilibrium. The set of Bayes correlated equilibria of a fixed incomplete information game equals the set of probability distributions over actions, states and types that might arise in any Bayes Nash equilibrium where players observed additional information. We show that more information always shrinks the set of Bayes correlated equilibria.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 62

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83


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Date posted: October 10, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen, Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information (October 10, 2011). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822; Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1941708 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1941708

Contact Information

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/
Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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