The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short-Horizon Investors
44 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2012 Last revised: 27 Feb 2014
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The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short-Horizon Investors
The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short-Horizon Investors
Date Written: February 26, 2014
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of public information in a perfect competition trading model populated by asymmetrically informed short-horizon investors with different levels of private information precision. We first show that information asymmetry reduces the amount of private information revealed by price in equilibrium (i.e., price informativeness) and can lead to multiple linear equilibria. We then demonstrate that the presence of both information asymmetry and short horizons provides a channel through which public information ináuences price informativeness and equilibrium uniqueness. We identify conditions under which public information increases or decreases price informativeness, and when multiple equilibria may arise. Our analysis shows that public information not only directly endows prices with more (public) information, it can also have an important indirect effect on the degree to which prices reveal private information.
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