Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 441-452, Summer 2011
12 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2011
Date Written: 2011
Using the sleep-disorder drug Provigil as a case study, this short symposium piece explores the anticompetitive harm presented by the combination of two distinct activities.
First, brand-name drug firms such as Cephalon, the developer of Provigil, have settled patent litigation by paying generic firms to delay entering the market. Second, brand firms, frequently at the end of a patent term, have engaged in "product hopping," switching from one means of administering a drug (e.g., tablet) to another (e.g., capsule).
The story of Provigil demonstrates the harm that can result from the combination of these two activities.
Keywords: patent, antitrust, settlements, product hopping, drugs, Hatch Waxman, Provigil, Cephalon
JEL Classification: I18, K21, L40, L41, L43, L65, O34, O38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Carrier, Michael A., Provigil: A Case Study of Anticompetitive Behavior (2011). Hastings Science & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 441-452, Summer 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1944365
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