Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission

61 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2011 Last revised: 10 Sep 2013

See all articles by Mikhail Golosov

Mikhail Golosov

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; University College London

Aleh Tsyvinski

Yale University; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Andrea Wilson

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2013

Abstract

This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment is drastically different from in a one-shot game. Our main result is that full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria, and show that complicated communication, where far-away types pool together, allows dynamic manipulation of beliefs to enable better information release in the future. If communication is restricted to be monotonic partitional, full revelation is impossible. Finally, we show how conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation.

Keywords: asymmetric information; cheap talk;, dynamic strategic communication;full information revelation

Suggested Citation

Golosov, Mikhail and Skreta, Vasiliki and Tsyvinski, Aleh and Tsyvinski, Aleh and Wilson, Andrea, Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission (April 2013). NYU Working Paper No. 2451/31761, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1944451

Mikhail Golosov

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

111 Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

Aleh Tsyvinski

Yale University ( email )

New Haven, CT 06520
United States

Yale University - Cowles Foundation ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-9163 (Phone)

Andrea Wilson (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
103
Abstract Views
1,440
rank
153,922
PlumX Metrics