69 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2011 Last revised: 2 Jan 2015
Date Written: June 13, 2012
Thirty years ago, Congress created the Federal Circuit for the overriding purpose of bringing uniformity to patent law. Yet less than half of the court’s cases are patent cases. Most Federal Circuit cases involve veterans benefits, government-employment actions, government contracts, and other matters. Although existing literature purports to study the Federal Circuit as an institution, these projects focus largely on the court’s patent cases. This Article, by contrast, considers whether the court’s nonpatent docket might affect the development of patent law and whether the court’s specialization in patent law has consequences for how it decides nonpatent cases.
These inquiries result in two primary contributions. First, drawing on institutional-choice theory, this Article suggests that certain litigants — particularly military veterans but also government employees and government contractors — should not be forced to litigate appeals in a specialized court in Washington, D.C. Second, the Article offers a structural remedy that might help cure a frequently discussed problem with Federal Circuit patent law: that it is not sufficiently sensitive to innovation policy. By replacing some of the court’s current nonpatent docket with a variety of commercial disputes (over which the Federal Circuit would not have exclusive jurisdiction), the court might better understand the role that patents play in stimulating (or impeding) innovation in different industries.
Keywords: Federal Circuit, appellate jurisdiction, patent law
JEL Classification: K40, K41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gugliuzza, Paul R., Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction (June 13, 2012). Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 100, p. 1437, 2012. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1945039