Why Ownership Matters? Entrepreneurship and the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe

38 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 1999

See all articles by Roman Frydman

Roman Frydman

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Marek P. Hessel

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business

Andrzej Rapaczynski

Columbia Law School

Date Written: April 1998

Abstract

This paper, based on a study of mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, seeks to explain the reasons behind the marked impact of ownership on firm performance which has been observed in a number of studies in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Focusing in particular on the differential impact of ownership on revenue and cost performance, the paper argues that privatized firms controlled by outside investors are more entrepreneurial than those controlled by corporate insiders or the state. The paper provides evidence that all state and privatized firms in transition economies engage in similar types of restructuring, but that product restructuring by firms owned by outsider investors is significantly more effective (in terms of revenue generation) than that by firms with other types of ownership. The paper also examines the impact of managerial turnover on revenue performance, as well as differences among managers of firms with different types of ownership, and concludes that the more entrepreneurial behavior of outsider-owned firms is due primarily to incentive effects, rather than human capital effects, of privatization. More specifically, the authors argue that the success of outsider-owned firms is due to their greater readiness to accept risks (as evidenced by the higher variance of the revenues generated by restructuring) and a lesser need to defend, and account for, their managerial decisions.

JEL Classification: P10, P12, P17

Suggested Citation

Frydman, Roman and Hessel, Marek P. and Rapaczynski, Andrzej, Why Ownership Matters? Entrepreneurship and the Restructuring of Enterprises in Central Europe (April 1998). Columbia Law School, Law-Econ Working Paper No. 172. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=194574 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.194574

Roman Frydman

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

19 West 4th Street
New York, NY 10012
United States

Marek P. Hessel

Fordham University - Gabelli School of Business ( email )

113 West 60th Street
New York, NY 10023
United States

Andrzej Rapaczynski (Contact Author)

Columbia Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States
(212) 854-3421 (Phone)
(212) 854-7946 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
877
Abstract Views
3,639
rank
25,806
PlumX Metrics