Government Policy and Ownership of Financial Assets

67 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2011

See all articles by Kristian Rydqvist

Kristian Rydqvist

State University of New York at Binghamton - School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joshua D. Spizman

Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance

Ilya A. Strebulaev

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

Since World War II, direct stock ownership by households across the globe has largely been replaced by indirect stock ownership by financial institutions. We argue that tax policy is the driving force. Using long time-series from eight countries, we show that the fraction of household ownership decreases with measures of the tax benefits of holding stocks inside tax-deferred plans. This finding is important for policy considerations on effective taxation and for financial economics research on the long-term effects of taxation on corporate finance and asset prices.

Suggested Citation

Rydqvist, Kristian and Spizman, Joshua D. and Strebulaev, Ilya A., Government Policy and Ownership of Financial Assets (October 2011). NBER Working Paper No. w17522, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1947179

Kristian Rydqvist (Contact Author)

State University of New York at Binghamton - School of Management ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Joshua D. Spizman

Loyola Marymount University - Department of Finance ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90045
United States
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HOME PAGE: http://www.joshuaspizman.com

Ilya A. Strebulaev

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

HOME PAGE: http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/strebulaev/

National Bureau of Economic Research ( email )

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