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Allocation Criteria Under Task Performance: The Gendered Preference for Protection

29 Pages Posted: 24 Oct 2011  

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Giacomo Degli Antoni

University of Parma

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS); Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nazaria Solferino

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: October 24, 2011

Abstract

We device a randomized experiment with task performance in which players directly decide allocation criteria (with/without) veil of ignorance on payoff distribution under different criteria in a stakeholder/spectator position. Our main result is a strong and significant gender effect: women choose significantly more protection (that is, they choose criteria in which a part or all the total sum of money that must be allocated among participants is equally distributed) before (but not after) the removal of the veil of ignorance. They also reveal less overconfidence and significantly higher civicness and inequality aversion in ex post questionnaire responses, even though such differences are not enough to fully capture our main result. The puzzle when interpreting it is that the gendered preference for protection exists not only for stakeholders but also for spectators while it disappears for both once we remove the veil of ignorance. This makes it impossible to explain it exclusively with risk or competition aversion.

Keywords: distributive justice, gender effects, risk aversion, competition aversion, veil of ignorance

JEL Classification: C91, D63, J16

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Degli Antoni, Giacomo and Ottone, Stefania and Solferino, Nazaria, Allocation Criteria Under Task Performance: The Gendered Preference for Protection (October 24, 2011). CEIS Working Paper No. 214. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1948387

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Giacomo Degli Antoni

University of Parma ( email )

Via Dell'Università, 12
Parma, 43121
Italy

Stefania Ottone

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milano, 20126
Italy

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nazaria Solferino

University of Rome, Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy

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