Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?

19 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2011

See all articles by Michael Moore

Michael Moore

George Washington University - Department of Economics

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Date Written: November 2011

Abstract

Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization even as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures. This raises the question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to non‐tariff barriers. Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant. This paper examines whether the use of antidumping is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs in a sample of 29 developing and six developed countries from 1991 through 2002. Evidence is found of a substitution effect only for a small set of heavy users of antidumping among developing countries. There is no similar statistically significant result for other developing countries or developed countries. Robust evidence is also found of retaliation and deflection effects as determinant of antidumping filings across all subsamples.

Suggested Citation

Moore, Michael O. and Zanardi, Maurizio, Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect? (November 2011). Review of Development Economics, Vol. 15, Issue 4, pp. 601-619, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1948929 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00630.x

Michael O. Moore (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://home.gwu.edu/~mom

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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