Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union

International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming

42 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2011 Last revised: 7 Nov 2012

See all articles by Christina J. Schneider

Christina J. Schneider

University of California, San Diego; Max Planck Institute for Economics

Jennifer Tobin

Georgetown University; The Brookings Institution; Nuffield College

Date Written: November 7, 2012

Abstract

This paper analyzes multilateral aid allocation in the European Union (EU). We argue that EU members can influence the aid allocation process towards their national interests if they form powerful coalitions that bias the European Commission's development policies. When EU members’ preferences over aid allocation are heterogeneous, the Commission can implement multilateral aid according to its programmatic goals. Greater homogeneity of EU members’ goals, however, increases the likelihood that members can form powerful interest coalitions, and induce the Commission to allocate aid according to their own national interests. The empirical analysis provides robust support for our theoretical argument and the findings generally indicate that interest coalitions play an important role in multilateral aid allocation.

Suggested Citation

Schneider, Christina J. and Tobin, Jennifer, Interest Coalitions and Multilateral Aid Allocation in the European Union (November 7, 2012). International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949236

Christina J. Schneider (Contact Author)

University of California, San Diego

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

Jennifer Tobin

Georgetown University ( email )

3600 N Street, NW Suite 200
Washington, DC 20057
United States

The Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20036-2188
United States

Nuffield College ( email )

New Road
Oxford, OX1 1NF
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
133
Abstract Views
899
Rank
425,807
PlumX Metrics