A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations: Callieres on Peace Politics

28 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2012

See all articles by Alain Lempereur

Alain Lempereur

Brandeis University; PON at Harvard Law School

Date Written: January 12, 2012

Abstract

The negotiation theory that François de Callières (1645-1716) built promotes peace politics in the international arena. First, the paper develops the political rationality that prevailed in the 17th Century, essentially under the realm of Louis XIV, whom Callières served as a diplomat. European power politics is dominated by the recurrence of wars, interrupted by truces only. In that context, negotiation is crucial, but essentially conceived as a means at the disposal of a bellicose agenda. Reversely, Callières is shown to propose a more ambitious alternative vision for future negotiators, and suggests they could be the key-players in peace politics, as long as the use of powerful persuasion serves legitimate ends. Princes should exhaust all the means of reason and persuasion that negotiation offers before waging wars. Then, according to Callières, European nations, with the interdependence of their interests could form one republic aspiring to common prosperity.

Keywords: Negotiation Theory, Diplomatic Negotiation, Callières, Louis XIV, War politics, Peace politics, Persuasion, Rhetoric, Interdependence of interests, Europe

JEL Classification: C7, D74

Suggested Citation

Lempereur, Alain Pekar, A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations: Callieres on Peace Politics (January 12, 2012). Harvard PON Working Paper No. 1949532. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949532 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1949532

Alain Pekar Lempereur (Contact Author)

Brandeis University ( email )

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Waltham, MA 02454
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