The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC

Berk, Jan Marc; Bierut, Beata K.; Meade, Ellen E.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1949761

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The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC

De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 261

24 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2011

See all articles by Jan Marc Berk

Jan Marc Berk

De Nederlandsche Bank; SUERF - The European money and finance forum

Ellen E. Meade

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

The literature on the behavior of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has focused on static voting patterns. We find statistical support for a dynamic pattern using a panel reaction function to analyze MPC votes over the 1997-2008 period. We find that internal and external members do not behave differently in their first year on the MPC. In their third year of tenure, internal members prefer higher policy rates, placing a higher weight on price stability and a lower weight on the output gap than external members.

Keywords: Central banking, Monetary policy committees, Bank of England, Voting

JEL Classification: D71, D72, E52, E58

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Berk, Jan Marc and Bierut, Beata K. and Meade, Ellen E., The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC (September 1, 2010). De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 261, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1949761