The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC

24 Pages Posted: 26 Oct 2011  

Jan Marc Berk

De Nederlandsche Bank; SUERF - The European money and finance forum

Beata K. Bierut

De Nederlandsche Bank

Ellen E. Meade

Federal Reserve Board

Date Written: September 1, 2010

Abstract

The literature on the behavior of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has focused on static voting patterns. We find statistical support for a dynamic pattern using a panel reaction function to analyze MPC votes over the 1997-2008 period. We find that internal and external members do not behave differently in their first year on the MPC. In their third year of tenure, internal members prefer higher policy rates, placing a higher weight on price stability and a lower weight on the output gap than external members.

Keywords: Central banking, Monetary policy committees, Bank of England, Voting

JEL Classification: D71, D72, E52, E58

Suggested Citation

Berk, Jan Marc and Bierut, Beata K. and Meade, Ellen E., The Dynamic Voting Patterns of the Bank of England's MPC (September 1, 2010). De Nederlandsche Bank Working Paper No. 261. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1949761 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1949761

Jan Marc Berk (Contact Author)

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

P.O. Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands
+31 20 524 3912 (Phone)
+31 20 524 2506 (Fax)

SUERF - The European money and finance forum ( email )

PO Box 98
Amsterdam, 1000AB
Netherlands

Beata K. Bierut

De Nederlandsche Bank ( email )

PO Box 98
1000 AB Amsterdam
Amsterdam, 1000 AB
Netherlands

Ellen E. Meade

Federal Reserve Board ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

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