Principled Monism and the Normative Conception of Coercion Under International Law

28 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2011

See all articles by George Pavlakos

George Pavlakos

University of Glasgow, School of Law

Joost Pauwelyn

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID); Georgetown University Law Centre

Date Written: October 27, 2011

Abstract

In this work we argue that the existence of a global legal order, where the lines between national and international law are increasingly blurred, must be grounded on a scheme of principles of justice (‘Principled Monism’). Rather than neatly structured based on strict separation, automatic incorporation or formal hierarchy of regimes, sources or norms (eg, international law trumps national law), these principles of justice are in many instances elaborated and further developed, if not constituted, by formally inferior or sub-international law contexts. The global legal order thereby presents itself as a collection of institutionalised norms that develop, expand and promote a scheme of principles of justice, which itself does not depend for its existence on any act of legal authority but merely requires for its activation and implementation some concrete instances of institutional intervention.

Keywords: international law, monism, coercion, justice, sources of law

Suggested Citation

Pavlakos, George and Pauwelyn, Joost, Principled Monism and the Normative Conception of Coercion Under International Law (October 27, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1950071 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1950071

George Pavlakos

University of Glasgow, School of Law ( email )

Stair Building
5 - 8 The Square
Glasgow, Scotland G12 8QQ
United Kingdom

Joost Pauwelyn (Contact Author)

Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) ( email )

PO Box 136
Geneva, Geneva CH-1211
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://graduateinstitute.ch

Georgetown University Law Centre ( email )

600 New Jersey Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
United States

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