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Is Mistrust Self-Fulfilling?

Economics Letters, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 89-91, 2009

8 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2011

See all articles by Ernesto Reuben

Ernesto Reuben

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

We study experimentally the effect of expectations on whether trust is repaid. Subjects respond with untrustworthy behavior if they see that little is expected of them. This suggests that guilt aversion plays an important role in the repayment of trust.

Keywords: trust, trustworthiness, reciprocity, guilt aversion, experiment

JEL Classification: C72, C91, Z13

Suggested Citation

Reuben, Ernesto and Sapienza, Paola and Zingales, Luigi, Is Mistrust Self-Fulfilling? (2009). Economics Letters, Vol. 104, No. 2, pp. 89-91, 2009, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1951649

Ernesto Reuben (Contact Author)

New York University (NYU) - New York University, Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paola Sapienza

Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management - Department of Finance ( email )

Evanston, IL 60208
United States
847-491-7436 (Phone)
847-491-5719 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Luigi Zingales

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

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