Will Firms Consider a European Optional Instrument in Contract Law?

20 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2011

See all articles by Gary Low

Gary Low

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law; Maastricht European Private Law Institute; Singapore Management University - Centre for Digital Law

Date Written: October 1, 2011

Abstract

The diversity of contract laws is said by the Commission to discourage cross-border trade and hinder the development by SMEs of a pan-European commercial policy. An optional instrument containing both facilitative general contract rules and mandatory consumer protection rules, one of the solutions proposed by the Commission, is gaining rapid support from key stakeholders. Drawing from firms’ own views on the problems of legal diversity, and insights from organizational science, this article sets out the circumstances in which firms will likely consider a European optional code. Results are mixed: some firms may consider it, while others may ignore it. Much depends the firm’s aspirations (i.e. SMEs cannot be assumed as-yet to have pan-European aspirations), how the firm perceives the problems of legal diversity, and how it searches for and decides upon solutions. It would appear that a European optional instrument may not be as useful or widely considered as its proponents would like to believe.

Keywords: contract law, harmonisation, behavioral analysis

JEL Classification: K12, D03, F15

Suggested Citation

Low, Gary, Will Firms Consider a European Optional Instrument in Contract Law? (October 1, 2011). European Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1951944

Gary Low (Contact Author)

Singapore Management University - Yong Pung How School of Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore, 179943
Singapore

Maastricht European Private Law Institute ( email )

P.O. Box 616
Maastricht, 6200
Netherlands

Singapore Management University - Centre for Digital Law ( email )

55 Armenian Street
Singapore
Singapore

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