Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and Insolvency Resolution
33 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2011
Date Written: October 2011
Abstract
During the recent financial crisis, central banks have provided liquidity and governments have set up rescue programmes to restore confidence and stability, often against the LLR principle advocated by Bagehot. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and monitors too little. A central bank can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce an additional authority that is able to bail out the bank either by injecting capital at a fixed return or by receiving an equity claim. This authority faces a trade-off: demanding a fixed premium increases investment but worsens moral hazard. Request for an equity claim by the fiscal authority reduces excessive risk taking at the expense of investment. This resembles the current situation on financial markets, in which banks take less risk but also provide less credit to the economy
Keywords: Bailout, Bank Regulation, Capital, Lender of Last Resort, Liquidity
JEL Classification: E58, G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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