Housing and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Bailout Guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises

48 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2011

See all articles by Karsten Jeske

Karsten Jeske

Mellon Capital Management - Research

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kurt Mitman

IIES

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

This paper evaluates the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (such as Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac) in the mortgage market. In order to do so we construct a model with heterogeneous, infinitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets. Households have the option to default on their mortgages, with the consequence of having their homes foreclosed. We model the bailout guarantee as a government provided and tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy. We find that eliminating this subsidy leads to substantially lower equilibrium mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: eliminating it benefits low-income and low-asset households who did not own homes or had small mortgages, while lowering the welfare of high-income, high-asset households.

Keywords: Default Risk, Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Housing, Mortgage Market

JEL Classification: E21, G11, R21

Suggested Citation

Jeske, Karsten and Krueger, Dirk and Mitman, Kurt, Housing and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Bailout Guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (October 2011). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8624. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1952485

Karsten Jeske (Contact Author)

Mellon Capital Management - Research ( email )

595 Market Street
Suite 3000
San Francisco, CA 94105
United States
415-546-6056 (Phone)

Dirk Krueger

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States
215-898-6691 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kurt Mitman

IIES ( email )

Stockholm, SE-10691
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://kurtmitman.com

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
1
Abstract Views
477
PlumX Metrics