On the Formation of International Migration Policies When No Country Has an Exclusive Policy-Setting Say

ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 157

32 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2011

See all articles by Oded Stark

Oded Stark

University of Bonn; University of Warsaw; University of Tuebingen; Georgetown University

Alessandra Casarico

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Carlo Devillanova

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management

Silke Uebelmesser

University of Jena - School of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: October 1, 2011

Abstract

This paper identifies the migration policies that emerge when both the sending country and the receiving country wield power to set migration quotas, when controlling migration is costly, and when the decision how much human capital to acquire depends, among other things, on the migration policies. The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of bilateral agreements in the shape of transfers to support migration controls, and in the shape of joint arrangements regarding the migration policy and the cost-sharing of its implementation. The paper shows that in equilibrium both the sending country and the receiving country can participate in setting the migration policy, that bilateral agreements can arise as a welfare-improving mechanism, and that the sending country can gain from migration even when it does not set its preferred policy.

Keywords: Human capital formation, International migration, Migration policies, Welfare analysis

JEL Classification: F22, I30, J24, J61

Suggested Citation

Stark, Oded and Casarico, Alessandra and Devillanova, Carlo and Uebelmesser, Silke, On the Formation of International Migration Policies When No Country Has an Exclusive Policy-Setting Say (October 1, 2011). ZEF-Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 157. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1953284

Oded Stark (Contact Author)

University of Bonn ( email )

Walter-Flex-Str. 3
Bonn, NRW 53113
Germany

University of Warsaw ( email )

Dluga Street 44/50
Warsaw, 00-241
Poland

University of Tuebingen

Wilhelmstr. 19
Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Alessandra Casarico

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Carlo Devillanova

Bocconi University - Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

Silke Uebelmesser

University of Jena - School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Carl-Zeiss-Str. 3
D-07743 Jena
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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