The Nonemptiness of the Inner Core
Meiji University - School of Political Science and Economics
November 4, 2011
We prove that if a non-transferable utility (NTU) game is balanced and if, at every individually rational efficient payoff vector, every non-zero normal vector to the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is strictly positive, then the inner core is nonempty. The condition on normal vectors is satisfied if the set of payoff vectors feasible for the grand coalition is non-leveled. An NTU game generated by an exchange economy where every consumer has a continuous, concave, and strongly monotone utility function satisfies our sufficient condition.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: inner core, inhibitive set, balancedness, NTU game
JEL Classification: C62, C71
Date posted: November 5, 2011