Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union

Posted: 5 Nov 2011

See all articles by Matthew Bunn

Matthew Bunn

affiliation not provided to SSRN

John P. Holdren

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: November 1997

Abstract

Abstract Effective approaches to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)-the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons-are fundamental to controlling nuclear proliferation and providing the basis for deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons stockpiles. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongoing dismantlement of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons are creating unprecedented stresses on the systems for managing these materials, as well as unprecedented opportunities for cooperation to improve these systems. In this article, we summarize the technical background to this situation, and the current and prospective security challenges posed by military stockpiles of these materials in the United States and Russia. We then review the programs in place to address these challenges, the progress of these programs to date, and the work remaining to be done, in five areas: (a) preventing theft and smuggling of nuclear warheads and fissile materials; (b) building a regime of monitored reductions in nuclear warhead and fissile material stockpiles; (c) ending further production of excess fissile materials; (d ) reducing stockpiles of excess fissile materials; and (e) avoiding economic collapse in the nuclear cities where substantial fractions of these materials and their guardians reside.

Suggested Citation

Bunn, Matthew and Holdren, John P., Managing Military Uranium and Plutonium in the United States and the Former Soviet Union (November 1997). Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, Vol. 22, pp. 403-486, 1997, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1954366 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.energy.22.1.403

Matthew Bunn (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

John P. Holdren

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
310
PlumX Metrics