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Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting

48 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2011  

Bernhard Ganglmair

University of Texas at Dallas - Managerial Economics

Emanuele Tarantino

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 2011

Abstract

We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.

Keywords: patent holdup, patent disclosure, standard setting organizations, industry standards, disclosure rules, conversation, asymmetric information, Bertrand competition

JEL Classification: D71, L15, O34

Suggested Citation

Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tarantino, Emanuele, Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (October 2011). NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957991

Bernhard Ganglmair (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Managerial Economics ( email )

800 W. Campbell Rd (SM31)
Richardson, TX 75080
United States

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/bganglmair

Emanuele Tarantino

University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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