48 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2011
Date Written: October 2011
We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.
Keywords: patent holdup, patent disclosure, standard setting organizations, industry standards, disclosure rules, conversation, asymmetric information, Bertrand competition
JEL Classification: D71, L15, O34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tarantino, Emanuele, Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (October 2011). NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957991