Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957991
 
 

Citations (2)



 


 



Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting


Bernhard Ganglmair


University of Texas at Dallas - Managerial Economics; Boston University - Department of Economics

Emanuele Tarantino


University of Mannheim - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

October 2011

NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15

Abstract:     
We present a model of industry standard setting with two-sided asymmetric information about the existence of intellectual property. We provide an equilibrium analysis of (a) firms' incentives to communicate ideas for improvements of an industry standard, and (b) firms' decisions to disclose the existence of intellectual property to other participants of the standardization process.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 48

Keywords: patent holdup, patent disclosure, standard setting organizations, industry standards, disclosure rules, conversation, asymmetric information, Bertrand competition

JEL Classification: D71, L15, O34


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Date posted: November 24, 2011  

Suggested Citation

Ganglmair, Bernhard and Tarantino, Emanuele, Patent Disclosure in Standard Setting (October 2011). NET Institute Working Paper No. 11-15. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957991

Contact Information

Bernhard Ganglmair (Contact Author)
University of Texas at Dallas - Managerial Economics ( email )
800 W. Campbell Rd (SM31)
Richardson, TX 75080
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/bganglmair
Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )
270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Emanuele Tarantino
University of Mannheim - Department of Economics ( email )
D-68131 Mannheim
Germany
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
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