Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements

CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-120

27 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2011

See all articles by Hassan Benchekroun

Hassan Benchekroun

McGill University - Department of Economics

Walid Marrouch

Lebanese American University; CIRANO

Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

University of Winnipeg - Department of Economics; Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Date Written: November 11, 2011

Abstract

While an international agreement over the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions proves to be elusive, there is a large and growing support for investment in developing more effective technologies to adapt to climate change. We show that an increase in effectiveness of adaptation will diminish the incentive of individual countries to free-ride on a global agreement over emissions. Moreover, we show that this positive effect of an increase in adaptation's effectiveness can also be accompanied by an increase in the gains from global cooperation over GHGs emissions.

Keywords: adaptation, climate change, international environmental agreements, trans-boundary pollution

JEL Classification: Q54, Q59

Suggested Citation

Benchekroun, Hassan and Marrouch, Walid and Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, Adaptation Effectiveness and Free-Riding Incentives in International Environmental Agreements (November 11, 2011). CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-120. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1957996 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1957996

Hassan Benchekroun (Contact Author)

McGill University - Department of Economics ( email )

855 Sherbrooke Street West
Montreal, QC H3A 2T7
Canada

Walid Marrouch

Lebanese American University ( email )

P.O. Box 13 - 5053
Chouran-Beirut
Beirut, 1102 2801
Lebanon

CIRANO ( email )

1130 Rue Sherbrooke #1400
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2M8
Canada

Amrita Ray Chaudhuri

University of Winnipeg - Department of Economics ( email )

Winnipeg, Manitoba R3B 2E9
Canada

Tilburg University - Center and Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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