Remedying a Lose-Lose Situation: How 'No Win, No Fee' Can Incentivize Post-Conviction Relief for the Wrongly Convicted

42 Pages Posted: 15 Nov 2011  

Elina Tetelbaum

Yale University - Law School

Date Written: 2010

Abstract

This Article proposes a policy measure that will likely lead to an increase in exonerations by creating economic incentives for attorneys to represent clients post-conviction.

Keywords: Contingent Fees, Exonerations, Wrongfully Convicted

Suggested Citation

Tetelbaum, Elina, Remedying a Lose-Lose Situation: How 'No Win, No Fee' Can Incentivize Post-Conviction Relief for the Wrongly Convicted (2010). Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 301, 2010. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1959523

Elina Tetelbaum (Contact Author)

Yale University - Law School ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

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