What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design
48 Pages
Posted: 17 Nov 2011
Clemson University
Universidad Tecnica Federico Santa Maria
Central Bank of Chile; George Mason University School of Law
Date Written: October 27, 2011
Abstract
Wireless license auctions have successfully replaced “beauty contests” in many countries. Competitive bidding (1) puts spectrum rights in the hands of the most productive firms; (2) reduces rent-seeking costs; and (3) captures license values for the public, potentially reducing costly tax distortions. Economists and policy makers have asymmetrically focused on (3). Yet, the overwhelming consumer welfare gains are produced in output (retail services) markets, not by extracting revenues from the sale of spectrum inputs. This fact leads to powerful policy implications, supporting liberal policies that permit market rivals to (quickly) access abundant bandwidth.
Keywords: CMRS, CTIA, cellular, Connecting America, data services, FCC, Federal Communications Commission National Broadband Plan, IMF, International Monetary Fund, Internet, John McMillan, market inefficiencies, MOU, Milgrom, minutes of use, mobile telephone, networks, Paul Klemperer, text messages, web
JEL Classification: L96
Suggested Citation:
Suggested Citation
Hazlett, Thomas W. and Munoz, Roberto E. and Avanzini, Diego Bernardo, What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation Design (October 27, 2011). Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 11-48. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961225
