Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers

61 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2011 Last revised: 24 Jul 2013

Date Written: 1996

Abstract

This Article proposes a market-based alternative to our current unpopular regime for financing federal election campaigns. Under the proposal, each voter receives vouchers for federal elections to contribute either to candidates directly or to interest groups; with limited exceptions, only funds from the voucher system could be spent to support or oppose candidates for elected federal offices. Using public choice theory, Professor Hasen argues that the voucher plan would promote an egalitarian political market in which each person has roughly equal political capital regardless of preexisting disparities in wealth, education, or organizational ability. After demonstrating that the current campaign finance regime favors wealthy and well-organized interests at the expense of the poor and those with diffuse interests, the author identifies four distinct benefits of the voucher proposal. First, the voucher proposal minimizes the role of wealth in the political process and facilitates the organization of those individuals who currently lack political capital. Second, the proposal is likely to promote a stable transition to a more egalitarian political order and a more chaotic, though fairer, legislative process. Third, the voucher proposal's market orientation registers the intensity of voter preferences well. Finally, the proposal has a realistic chance of being enacted and of passing constitutional muster. The author concludes by demonstrating the superiority of the voucher plan under the four criteria to non-voucher public financing of Congressional campaigns, proportional representation, and group-based political solutions

Suggested Citation

Hasen, Richard L., Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers (1996). California Law Review, Vol. 84, No. 1, p. 1, January 1996, UC Irvine School of Law Research Paper No. 2011-50, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961263 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961263

Richard L. Hasen (Contact Author)

UCLA School of Law ( email )

3102063103 (Phone)
90095-1476 (Fax)

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