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Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization

Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Forthcoming

University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 171

40 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2011 Last revised: 30 Oct 2012

Maurice E. Stucke

University of Tennessee College of Law; The Konkurrenz Group

Date Written: November 17, 2011


One hot topic is whether Google has violated the antitrust laws. Another important topic is how behavioral economics can enrich antitrust policy. This Essay examines two implications of behavioral economics on antitrust monopolization law.

The Essay first discusses trial-and-error learning as an entry barrier. This is timely given the current debate over the entry barriers of the search engine market.

The Essay next discusses behavioral exploitation to maintain a monopoly. The behavioral economics literature can help explain the European Commission’s tying claims against Microsoft, why the Commission’s original remedy failed, and the benefits and risks of the Commission’s remedy involving its subsequent prosecution of Microsoft over Internet browsers.

Keywords: behavioral economics, antitrust, tying, section 2, abuse of dominance, Sherman Act, entry barriers

JEL Classification: L12, L11, L40, L41, L63, D42

Suggested Citation

Stucke, Maurice mname, Behavioral Antitrust and Monopolization (November 17, 2011). Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Forthcoming; University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 171. Available at SSRN: or

Maurice Stucke (Contact Author)

University of Tennessee College of Law ( email )

1505 W. Cumberland Ave.
Knoxville, TN 37996
United States
865-974-9816 (Phone)


The Konkurrenz Group ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Ave., NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

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