Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence

62 Pages Posted: 20 Nov 2011 Last revised: 7 Nov 2015

Rui A. Albuquerque

Boston College, Carroll School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Art Durnev

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business

Yrjo Koskinen

Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 23, 2015

Abstract

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms have a choice to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR activities as a product differentiation strategy allowing firms to benefit from higher profit margins. The model predicts that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value and that these effects are stronger for firms operating in differentiated goods industries and when consumers' expenditure share on CSR goods is small. We find supporting evidence for our predictions. We address a potential endogeneity problem by instrumenting CSR using data on the political affiliation of the firm's home state.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, product differentiation, systematic risk, beta, firm value, industry equilibrium

JEL Classification: G12, G32, D43, L13, M14

Suggested Citation

Albuquerque, Rui A. and Durnev, Art and Koskinen, Yrjo, Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence (October 23, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1961971 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1961971

Rui A. Albuquerque

Boston College, Carroll School of Management ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chustnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States

HOME PAGE: http://ruialbuquerque.webs.com

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Artyom Durnev (Contact Author)

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )

Acquisitions
5020 Main Library
Iowa City, IA 52242-1000
United States
(514) 398-5394 (Phone)
(514) 398-3876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.artdurnev.com

Yrjo J Koskinen

Haskayne School of Business, University of Calgary ( email )

SH 154, 2500 University Drive NW
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada
+1-403-220-5540 (Phone)

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