Disclosure of Status in an Agency Setting

45 Pages Posted: 23 Nov 2011 Last revised: 13 Jun 2014

See all articles by Anthony M. Marino

Anthony M. Marino

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business

Oguzhan Ozbas

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department

Date Written: June 2014

Abstract

We develop a model in which the principal and the agent share private information about the value of the agent for a multi-agent organization. The principal can disclose private information and make public the relative standing or status of all agents in the organization. We study whether it is better in terms of profit and utility to disclose or to not disclose status to the group of agents. Conditions for the optimality of disclosure versus non-disclosure are characterized for the cases of exogenous and endogenous human capital.

Keywords: Status, Disclosure, Human Capital

JEL Classification: D82, D63, L23, M52, M54

Suggested Citation

Marino, Anthony M. and Ozbas, Oguzhan, Disclosure of Status in an Agency Setting (June 2014). Marshall School of Business Working Paper No. FBE 06.12, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1963060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963060

Anthony M. Marino

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business ( email )

Dept. of Finance & Business Economics
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-6525 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

Oguzhan Ozbas (Contact Author)

University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business - Finance and Business Economics Department ( email )

Marshall School of Business
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
213-740-0781 (Phone)
213-740-6650 (Fax)

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