Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast)

39 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2011 Last revised: 6 Dec 2011

See all articles by Ilaria Pretelli

Ilaria Pretelli

Swiss Institute of Comparative Law; University of Urbino

Date Written: September 20, 2011

Abstract

The French version of this paper can be found at : http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965949

The effective development of mutual trust requires a solid foundation. Asserting such trust a priori could compromise relationships between different States rather than accelerating the process of integration. The abolition of the exequatur system entails a real risk of an increase of forum shopping and procedural frauds. Instead of reforming the architecture and foundations of the Brussels I Regulation, which has already been shown to operate effectively, it would be preferable to strengthen the efficacy of the Regulation by simplifying its rules and imposing mandatory deadlines and means to sanction instances of fraud. The associated economic benefits will follow ipso facto.

Keywords: private international law, European Union, Brussels I Regulation (Regulation (EC) 44/2001), Lugano Convention, Exequatur, International legal order, Reflexive effect, Choice of court agreements, arbitration agreements, Torpedo actions, Lis pendens, right to strike

JEL Classification: K10, K30, K31, K33, K40, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Pretelli, Ilaria, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) (September 20, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1963155 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963155

Ilaria Pretelli (Contact Author)

Swiss Institute of Comparative Law ( email )

Lausanne, CH-1015
Switzerland

University of Urbino ( email )

Via Saffi 2
Urbino, Pesaro-Urbino 61029
Italy

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