Rocky Marriage: A Theory of Presidents and Their Parties

Abstract

Institutional settings place executives and their parties in a tense relation of dependence and confrontation. These two actors need one another to achieve their goals; however, divergent interests and commitment problems make collaboration problematic. Under which circumstances should we expect presidents to get their parties’ support to modify the status quo? At this moment, we lack a theory explaining how these actors are interrelated. To help to fill this gap, I develop a game-theoretic framework that explains when and how presidents are able to get their parties’ cooperation. Parties’ support of their presidents is a function of presidential capacity to credibly commit to compensating, the expected electoral return of executives’ actions, and parties’ capability to credibly threaten their presidents should they not reciprocate. I illustrate the game equilibria with brief analytical narratives of Latin American presidents and their parties.

Keywords: Presidential decision-making, political-parties, Latin America