The Political Economy of Fiscal Reforms in Latin America: Mexico

79 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2011

See all articles by Eric Magar

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department

Vidal Romero

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Jeffrey F. Timmons

NYU Abu Dhabi

Date Written: September 9, 2009

Abstract

This paper describes the main features of the Mexican fiscal system, details the most important changes that have occurred/not occurred over the past two decades, and explains what factors influenced the rate, degree and direction of change. In brief, we contend that there have been profound and ideologically consistent changes in spending assignment and in the institutional arrangements governing taxes, spending and debt management. Over the past 20 years, Mexico has moved from a highly centralized fiscal system characterized by extensive presidential discretion to a moderately decentralized system with more meaningful checks and balances. Decentralization of spending assignments has been coupled with steps designed to increase transparency, efficiency and accountability over public funds. Changes to the revenue collection system, by contrast, have been considerably smaller in magnitude and not quite as consistent in ideational terms; while the general trend has been to increase tax revenue in an equitable manner, not all changes in tax law have increased revenue or equity.

Keywords: Fiscal reform, decentralization, democratization, Mexico

Suggested Citation

Magar, Eric and Romero, Vidal and Timmons, Jeffrey F., The Political Economy of Fiscal Reforms in Latin America: Mexico (September 9, 2009). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1963863 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1963863

Eric Magar

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department ( email )

Rio Hondo 1
Col. Tizapan San-Angel
Mexico City, D.F. 01000
Mexico
525556284079 (Phone)
525554904674 (Fax)

Vidal Romero (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

Jeffrey F. Timmons

NYU Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
(971) 262 84523 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/academics/faculty/jeffrey-timmons.html

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