Terrorism and Cabinet Duration

18 Pages Posted: 25 Nov 2011

See all articles by Martin Gassebner

Martin Gassebner

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Richard Jong‐A‐Pin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Jochen O. Mierau

University of Groningen; Netspar

Date Written: November 2011

Abstract

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970–2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

Suggested Citation

Gassebner, Martin and Jong‐A‐Pin, Richard and Mierau, Jochen O., Terrorism and Cabinet Duration (November 2011). International Economic Review, Vol. 52, Issue 4, pp. 1253-1270, 2011. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1964492 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x

Martin Gassebner (Contact Author)

ETH Zurich - KOF Swiss Economic Institute ( email )

Weinbergstrasse 35
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://www.kof.ethz.ch/chair/

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Richard Jong‐A‐Pin

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Jochen O. Mierau

University of Groningen ( email )

P.O. Box 800
9700 AV Groningen
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.rug.nl/staff/j.o.mierau

Netspar

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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