Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-166/1
31 Pages Posted: 28 Nov 2011
Date Written: November 22, 2011
We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We derive the optimal fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under these legal principles. This optimal fine schedule induces collusion on a lower price making it more attractive than on higher prices. Also, raising minimum fines reduces social welfare and should never be implemented. Our analysis and results relate to the marginal deterrence literature by Shavell (1992) and Wilde (1992).
Keywords: antitrust enforcement, antitrust law, cartel, oligopoly, repeated game
JEL Classification: L4, K21, D43, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Houba, Harold and Motchenkova, Evgenia and Wen, Quan, Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence (November 22, 2011). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 11-166/1. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1964751 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1964751