School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds

42 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2011 Last revised: 20 Nov 2014

See all articles by Lars Ehlers

Lars Ehlers

University of Montreal - D├ępartement de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ

Isa Emin Hafalir

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business

M. Bumin Yenmez

Boston College

Muhammed Ali Yildirim

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Date Written: November 1, 2012

Abstract

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of di fferent student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard bounds, there might not exist assignments that satisfy standard fairness and non-wastefulness properties; and only constrained non-wasteful assignments which are fair for same type students can be guaranteed to exist. We introduce the student exchange algorithm with hard bounds (SEAHB) that finds a Pareto optimal assignment among such assignments. To achieve fair (across all types) and non-wasteful assignments, we propose the control constraints to be interpreted as soft bounds- flexible limits that regulate school priorities dynamically. In this setting, the deferred acceptance algorithm with soft bounds (DAASB) finds an assignment that is Pareto optimal among fair assignments while eliciting true preferences. Thus, we demonstrate DAASB has clear benefi ts over SEAHB.

Keywords: School Choice, Affirmative Action

JEL Classification: C78, D61, D78, I20

Suggested Citation

Ehlers, Lars and Hafalir, Isa Emin and Yenmez, M. Bumin and Yildirim, Muhammed Ali, School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds (November 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1965074 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1965074

Lars Ehlers

University of Montreal - D├ępartement de Sciences Economiques and CIREQ ( email )

C.P. 6128, succursale Centre-Ville
Montreal, Quebec H3C 3J7
Canada

Isa Emin Hafalir

Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business ( email )

5000 Forbes Avenue
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

M. Bumin Yenmez (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Ave.
Maloney Hall 327
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

Muhammed Ali Yildirim

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
194
rank
147,311
Abstract Views
1,347
PlumX Metrics